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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
REBECCA McKELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
SPANISH FORK CITY, a Municipal
Corporation, .ThiARCELL US NIELSON, J. W. ANDERSON, ED M.
BECK, ARTHUR G R 0 T E G U T ,
BERT D. ISAAC, J. ROWE LEWIS,
.and LINDSEY B. SNELL, et al,

Civil No. 8494

Defendants and Respondents.

STArrEMENT OF CASE
This action was commenced by A. T. McKell, now
deceased, against Spanish Fork City, Its Mayor, City
Councilmen, and Lindsey B. Snell, Its Water Superintendent, Utah County, and Its County Commissioners,
and some of its employees, and also some of the employees of the State Road Commission of the State of
Utah.
After the action was commenced and before the
same came on for trial, Rebecca McKell, the wife of A.
T. McKell, was substituted as plaintiff in lieu of her
deceased husband, A. T. McKell. The basis for making
the substitution was that Rebecca McKell was .a joint
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tenant with her husband, A. T. McKell, prior to his
death, and was such joint tenant at the time complained
of in the Complaint. (R. 56-57). The action is for damages done to plaintiff's lands, the improvements and
personal property thereon by reason of the defendants
having constructed a dyke along a road, the title to which
was in Utah County, Utah. Such road extends east for
about one-third of a mile from the northeast corner of
plaintiff's land. As a result of the construction of the
dyke along the road, large quantities of water which
had overflowed the banks of Spanish Fork River, were
concentrated along the southern side of the dyke so
constructed and forced over plaintiff's lands. The water
so forced over plaintiff's land cut large gulleys through
the same and carried away improvements, together with
some farming equipment located thereon. It is so alleged
in the complaint (R. 20) and the a1nendment thereto (R.
50 and 54).
Numerous motions were filed by the defendants
whereby they sought the dismissal of the action on
various grounds. \V e shall not undertake a discussion of
such motion because before the cause can1e on for trial,
such 1notions were all disposed of and the case was
tried on the issues raised by plaintiff's A1nended Complaint (R. 20) and the mnend1nent thereto, and th.J
answers of the defendant Spanish Fork City and Its officers. Before the case came on for trial the action w.as
dis1nissed as to all of the defendants except Spanish
Fork City and its officers. The dismissal was had pursuant to a motion of plaintiff, A. T. 1\Icl(ell. (R. 63). It
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will be seen from the motion that the same was made
and granted pursuant to a stipulation and the payment
of the sum of $2000.00 by Utah County and $2000.00
with an appropriation made by the Legislature of the
State of Utah. It will be noted that the motion and the
order granting the smne were with prejudice as to the
parties against whom the same was dismissed, but without prejudice .as to those against whom it was not dismissed; that is, without prejudice as to Spanish Fork
City, its Mayor, City Councilmen and Superintendent
of its Water Works. (R. 63 to 65). In its original
answer Spanish Fork City and its officers alleged that
they did not participate in the construction of the dyke
except to permit some of the trucks belonging to the
City to haul some of the gravel (under the direction of
Utah County) onto the road extending east from the
northeast corner of plaintiff's land. The City and its
officers also alleged that plaintiff consented to the acts
complained of and that the damage done was caused by
an act of God, and by reason of the construction of a
new channel resulting in draining off the water that
had escaped from Spanish Fork River. (R. 41 to 44 and
49 to 52, both inclusive).
After the plaintiff had rested, the defendants over
the objection of plaintiff, moved for leave to amend its
pleading "to strike from the answer to the Amended
Answer - it is paragraph - I don't know how they
number it, but it says paragraph three on the third page.
It starts there, "That at the time and times herein
mentioned, the Spani~h Fork River after it went under
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the bridge or the State Highway 91, and so forth. The
evidence certainly shows otherwise." The defendants
further asked leave to add to their pleading as an affirmative defense, to put in here the words "That at
the time the elevation of the road to the Northeast of
plaintiff's property was raised a great flood emergency
existed resulting from the flood from Spanish Fork
River, and in order to protect themselves from a common
enemy, the City of Spanish Fork furnished trucks to
Utah County in an effort to raise the elevation of the
county road" and allege as a further affirmative matter
that they did what they had a right to do and that they
had a right to do so.;' (Tr. 202-203) The motions were
granted. (Tr. 203-204) and later on January 26, 1956
an amendment was filed. (R.140-141)
A trial was had with a jury on the issues raised by
the amended complaint with the amendment thereto and
the answer of the defendant, Spanish Fork City and its
officers. The Jury on November 19, 1955 found for the
plaintiff and assessed her damage against Spanish
Fork City in the sum of $2072.00 (R. 123). Thereafter the
court set aside the verdict and granted judgment in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no
cause of action. (R. 135-136)
The plaintiff by this appeal seeks a reversal of the
judgment of the court below in vacating the verdict of
the jury and granting defendant city judgment of no
cause of action notwithstanding the verdict, and to have
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re-instated the verdict and the judgment pursuant thereto.
While there is some conflict in the evidence as to
the amount of damage sustained by the plaintiff on account of the forcing of the water complained of across
plaintiff's land and some other minor matters, there
is no substantial conflict in the evidence as to the f,acts
which form the basis of plaintiff's complaint.
These facts ,are established without any conflict in
the evidence :
During the winter of 1951 and 1952, there was more
than the usual amount of snow fall on the water shed
which drains into Spanish Fork River. In the late winter of 1952 it became apparent that there was grave danger of high water as soon as there was warm weather.
It was anticipated that there would be flood w·aters about
six weeks before the high waters actually come down.
(Tr. 121-122). On April 2, 1952, the following appears
in the minutes of the meeting of the City Council on that
day:
"11:r. Parley Neeley, Ray Bradford, Wm. R.
Jex, Orson Brown, Richard Taylor, S. A. Bradford, Dean Ludlow, Andrew Nelson and Garland
Swenson met with the council to discuss the flood
problem of our community. Mr. Wm. R. Jex was
spokesman and Parley Neeley explained very
thoroughly the problem we are faced with by
means of a map, picturing the river district.
Mayor reports that county would help if property
holders would sign a waiver so that they can go
in and work on any and all property."
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"Councilman Grotegut moved that the following be selected as flood control committee: Mr.
L. B. Snell, Councilman Beck representing City,
Wm. R. Jex, Garland Swenson, Bishop Harold
Swenson, Ray Bradford and Dean Ludlow. They
are to go ahead and meet with county and work
out plans to do what is necessary for the flood
control agreeable to all property owners concerned. They are to select their own chairman.
Seconded by Councilman Isaac. Vote unanimous."
( Trs. 92-93)
On April 11, 1952, the following appears in the
l\iinutes of the City Council of Spanish Fork City:
"Councilman Anderson moved that we go
along with County and State in $2000.00 each on
dyke road and do all we can to cooperate with
County and State in construction of road dyke
and to authorize Mayor and Recorder to sign
county agreement. Seconded by councilman Isaac.
Vote Unanimous." (Tr. 93)
An agreement was signed along in June and July 1952,
see defendants' Exhibit 1.
By an instrument dated ~\_pril 2, H)32, smne of the
property owners along Spanish Fork RiYer signed what
is designated as a Release. The original plaintiff in this
action, Arthur T. l\JcJ~ell, \YH8 an1ong the signers. The
instrument is 1narked Exhibit D. 39. Such instrument
in part provides :
"That we, propert~~ owners, along Spanish
Fork River in Sections (nan1ing them) and also
property owners ,along the canals and tributaries,
of the Spanish Fork River in the above sections,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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do hereby release the State of Utah, Utah County,
the United States of America through the U.S.
Engineers and the City of Spanish Fork from all
liability for dmnages to any real or personal property owned by the signers hereto in the ,above
described sections along the Spanish Fork River,
or along its canals and tributaries, by reason of
work done or by or at the instance of any of the
above described bodies politic, in dredging, cleaning, sand-bagging, doing revertment work and
bank protection, removing debris, removing other
obstructions, or doing any other work to alleviate
flood conditions or present flooding from the
Spanish Fork River or any of its canals or tributaries or drainage system fed by the Spanish
Fork River."
In his deposition which was read to the jury (Tr.
97-99) because Mr. A. T. :McKell was dead at the tirne
of the trial, he testified concerning what was said when
the so c.alled above Tnentioned Release was signed aR
follows:
That he did sign permission to take heavy equipment
across his land to the river to clean out the river; that
he was asked if he would sign this slip; that Mr. McKell
said "Bishop, this is in case of wanting to get to the
river with heavy equipment" (which was on the west
of his land) ... "is just permission to cross your ground.
"That he re.ad the agreement before he signed it (Deposition of A. T. McKell, pages 18 ,and 19) Mrs. McKell
testified that she was present when the so-called release was signed by her husband and that at that time
:J.fr. :McKell was told by Mr. Swenson, who brought the
so-called release to the home of the plaintiff, that the
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purpose of signing the instrument was to get consent to
take heavy equipment over plaintiff's land that they
were going to clean out the river. (Tr. 195) Mr. Swenson was questioned about the circumstances surrounding
the signing of the so-called release, but his testimony
does not shed much light on what was s.aid at the time
Mr. M.:cKell signed the same. His testimony is not in
conflict with that of the McKells. (Tr. 302-304)
Spanish Fork River began flooding over the adjoining lands to the north and west of its channel in
April 1952 and continued into the month of May 1952.
It is so alleged in the Amended Complaint, (R. 22) and
so admitted in defendants' Answer thereto. (R. 41) Th·~
evidence shows that the flood water that caused the
damage complained of occurred during the latter part
of April and the early part of !1:ay. (See testimony of
Frances Lundell (Tr. 105): deposition of A. T. McKell,
page 4 & 5; testimony of Arthur 11. l\fcKell, Tr. 188)
At and before the time involved in this controversy
there was a canal extending along the e.ast boundary of
the :McKell property, along the east banks of which was
a growth of willows a.nd briars. (Tr. 6-7 and also Trs.
101). The slope of the land to the east of the plaintiff's
property w.as towards the east and north. (Tr. 106 ~ Tr.
79; Tr. 54 to 59) Spanish Fork City is and at all times
complained of was the owner of a tract of land and
improvements thereon to the south and just outside of
the city which the city leased for $150.00 a year for a
stock sale .and sheds (Tr. 289) Such property is about
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2900 feet northwest of the McKell property (Tr. 61) anrl
is about 15 feet 4 inches lower than the northeast corner of the plaintiff's property. (Tr. 58)
There is a slight conflict in the evidence as to
whether or not the plaintiff consented to the blasting
of holes through the banks of the canal which marked
the east boundary line of plaintiff's property. Plaintiff
A. T. McKell said he did not so consent. (Deposition
of Mr. McKell, page 38) Mr. Wm. Jex testified that
Mr. :McKell asked him if something could not be done
to contain the water in one channel. ( Tr. 255 to 256)
Sometime after April 2, 1952 (Tr. 17) the exact date
does not appear, some of the officers of Spanish Fork
City, Utah County, and the State Road Commission
entered into .an oral arrangement whereby the road extending east from the northeast corner of plaintiff's land
should be raised and the expense therefor was to be
paid in equal amounts by Utah County, Spanish Fork
City and the State Road Commission, for the purpose
of raising the road which extended to a hill about 1/3
of .a mile east from the northeast corner of plaintiff's
land. The estimated cost of this work was about
$6000.00. Each of the parties were to furnish some equipment. (Tr. 13 to 17). Pursuant to such agreement the
road was raised about 2 feet on the east end thereof
and about 4 feet on the west end. (Tr. 26) As a result
of raising the road, the water w.as forced over plaintiff's
property. The water which escaped from the Spanish
Fork River had spread over a large area of land to the
east of plaintiff's property before it reached the dyke

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

road, that is to say, the ro.ad was a little over 1/3 of
a mile long. ( Tr. 191) There were 3 culverts under the
road. They were 12 inch culverts, one of which was
covered up. (Tr. 192) The water that escaped from
Spanish Fork River had flowed some distance from the
river before it reached the road which was raised. Mayor
Nielson estimated the distance .at from 40 to 80 rods.
(Tr. 282)
Soon after the road was raised it became apparent
that great damage was being done to the plaintiff's
property by the large quantity of water that w.as being
forced over the same.
W m. R. J ex who had been active in a plan whereby his property would be saved from flooding secured
some powder to enable Frances Lundell to do some blasting on plaintiff's property. (Tr. 101) :.Jir. Lundell put
in a number of blasts whereby a channel was cut through
the banks of the canal which fonned the east boundary
of plaintiff's land and also through plaintiff's land to
the river. (Tr. 103) By that means a channel was cut
through plaintiff's land in which the 1vater was concentrated (Tr. 104) That blasting \Yas done about May
5th or 6th. (Tr. 105). Arthur :.Jirl~ell expressed it as
his opinion that if it had not been for the dyking of t~e
road his property would not have been damaged and
that he could have saved the washing away of the land
next to the river if it had not been because the large
amount of water that was accu1nulated next to the dyked
road .and forced over his land prevented him from getting
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onto his land with equipment and cutting down trees
that were growing along the banks of the river. We quote
a portion of his testimony touching that matter:
"If I could have gotten across (the water
flowing over the northern part of plaintiff's land)
why I think there is some land on the west, the
northwest corner, I could have saved, by dropping those trees .along the bank, there were trees
available for that purpose."
That he had lived on a ranch where he had a lot of flood
w.ater to contend with. That he had a fraction over 25
acres of land in the premises involved in this action. Deposition of Arthur T. :McKell, Trs. 8-9. He thus described
the damage done to his land :
The land was worth $600.00 per acre, some land just
north of his land sold for that amount per acre. (Dep.
9-10) That the following improvements and personal
property was washed .away. A manure spreader of the
value of $60.00, a hay rake of the value of $50.00, a
spring tooth of the value of $25.00, a harrow of the value
of $25.00. The corral and yard of the value of $1,412.26.
That he had been engaged in the lumber business for
36 ye.ars and knew the value of lumber; that the material
in the feed manger had a value of $408.75 (Tr. 11) That
the fence which was washed away had a value of $240.00
of which he should get 80% from the government (Tr.
12) That he had not received anything from the government; that the government charged $1300.00 for leveling the land for which he was to p.ay $330.00. (Tr. 13)
That in addition to the $240.00 for fences, there was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
$560.15, making a total of $800.15, (Tr. 14) That the
flowing well was broken off by the flood and to drill a
new well would cost about $500.00. (at the time of the
trial the well had been repaired at a cost of $125.00 (Tr.
197) ). The witness was not certain as to the number of
acres of land that was washed away. He gave it as his
opinion that about one-half of his land was washed away
and that not washed away was depreciated in value 25%.
(Tr. 16) That the value of the land, the top of which
was washed away was of little value, probably not over
$100.00 (Depos. 17)
Other evidence offered by plaintiff at the trial came
from Lawrence M. Atwood, a real estate broker, who
was sent over by Utah County to appraise the damage
done to the l\fcKell property. He placed the value of
the land at $600.00 per acre. (Tr. 37). He further testified that between 3 and 4 acres of land were washed
away by reason of the water being forced over plaintiff's land. (Tr. 37). Other testimony touching the damage done to the plaintiff's property was given by Mark
I\1:cKell who testified ihat no crops could be grown on
the property here involved in either 1952 or 1953 except
about 3 acres. (Tr. 1±4) That only about 15 acres of
land was saved from the 25 ac.res. ( Tr. 145) Evidence
was also offered .and received as to the productivity of
the land before it was damaged by having the top soil
removed. See testimony of Arthur T. McKell (Tr. 185186 and testimony of S. R. Boswell (Tr. 124-129.)
Numerous photographs of the I\ld~elly property were
received in evidence from which the damage done can
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be seen. There is other evidence touching the amount of
damage sustained by reason of the water having been
forced over plaintiff's land, but at this time we refrain
from discussing the same in greater detail because we
do not know the basis for the court granting defendant
city a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Suffice it
to say that the evidence shows that plaintiff was damaged in the following amounts: About $2000.00 for the
machinery and improve1nents w.ashed away, in excess
of $2000.00 for the land washed away, about $3000.00 in
damage to the land not washed away, and another
$2000.00 or more due to the fact that the land not washed
away did not produce any crops because of its being
leveled.
As we understood the situation at the time the matter was argued in the lower court, the judgment rendered
by the court was not because the evidence did not establish the amount of damage found by the jury. That
being so, probably no useful purpose will be served at
this time, by a further discussion of that phase of the
case. Should defendant city make the claim that the
evidence as to the matter of damages is not sufficient
to support the verdict of the jury, we can probably meet
such contention in a reply brief.
ARGUMENT
An examination of the various pleadings and
tions filed in this case will reveal that the defendant
has advanced a number of theories upon which it
based its defense to the action brought against it

mocity
has
and
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then has apparently abandoned such defense and shifted
to other and at time inconsistent defenses. Thus under
date of March 23, 1953 the defendant city moved to dismiss the action because the acts complained of were
committed beyond the city and therefore ultra vires.
(R. 59).
The next 1notion filed by defendant city was to
dismiss the action set out in the amended complaint because the facts therein alleged were ultra vires and
were done as a governmental function. (R. 60) By its
next motion, the defendant city sought summary judgment. (Tr. 68) In its original ans\Yer to plaintiff's
amended complaint, the defendant city sets up as an
affirmative defense that it did not participate in the
performance of the acts complained of except that some
of the trucks belonging to Spanish Fork City were used
by Utah County to haul the gravel to raise the ro.ad
extending easterly from plaintiff's land; that the plaintiff consented to the doing of that which was done by
the defendants who were released fron1 any damage
that may have been done by the .acts complained of;
that the damage done to plaintiff's land was an Act of
God; that the dan1age con1plained of was caused by the
straightening of the river channel below the McKell
property; that the officers were too busy trying to save
its spring water to devote any time with respect to the
handling of the water that flowed across plaintiff's land;
that the water which was forced over the plaintiff's
land was brought about by a wire fence along the south
side of the road which was raised against which fence
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weeds, paper and debris lodged causing the water to be
diverted across plaintiff's land. (R. 41-44) After the
plaintiff had offered its evidence and rested, the defendant city asked and was granted leave to strike its
allegation to the effeet that plaintiff's damage was
caused by the straightening of the river below the McKell land, and to amend the pleading by alleging that "at
the time the elevation of the county road was raised, a
great flood emergency existed resulting from the threatened flood of the Spanish Fork River and in order to
protect itself and others from a common enemy and disaster, the city of Spanish Fork participated with Utah
County in raising the elevation of the county road and
further allege that it had a right under the law so to do in
order to save itself from a common enemy." (R. 140) It
will be noted that the amendment was made long after the
action was concluded. We, of course, are mindful that
a defendant may assert and rely upon as many defenses
as he or it may desire, but we do contend that the court
abused its discretion }n permitting the .amendment that
was allowed after the plaintiff had concluded its evidence
and rested.
We are at a loss to know the exact basis of the
judgment appealed from. That is the judgment awarding the defendant city a judgment of no cause of action
notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. However, we
shall discuss those matters which apparently the court
below had in mind in rendering the judgment appealed
from under the following points.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
DEFENDANTS TO AMEND THEIR PLEADING BY STRIKING FROM THE COMPLAINT THE ALLEGATIONS TO THE
EFFECT THAT THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THE
PLAINTIFF WAS CAUSED BY A CHANGE IN THE
COURSE OF THE RIVER AND SUBSTITUTING THEREFOR
THE ALLEGATION THAT THE DEFENDANT CITY HAD
A RIGHT TO DO WHAT WAS DONE BECAUSE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF AN EMERGENCY TO PROTECT ITS PROPERTY FROM A COMMON ENEMY (Tr. 140).

POINT TWO
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW THAT THE PLAINTIFF RELEASED THE DEFENDANT CITY FROM LIABILITY ON ACCOUNT OF THE DAMAGE COMPLAINED OF.

POINT THREE
UNDER THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE, THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS IS NOT INVOLVED.

POINT FOrR
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT, AS A
MATTER OF LAW OR AT ALL, JUSTIFY THE VACATING
OF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE GRANTING OF
A JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT CITY NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT BY REASON OF AN
EMERGENCY.

POINT Fil'"E
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT, AS A
MATTER OF LAW OR AT ALL, JUSTIFY THE VACATING
OF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE GRANTING
OF A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
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UNDER THE DOCTRINE THAT FLOOD WATER IS A COMMON ENEMY AGAINST WHICH A LAND OWNER MAY DO
WHAT WAS HERE DONE TO PROTE,CT ITS PROPERTY.

POINT SIX
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE AMOUNT
AWARDED TO HER BY THE JURY BY REASON OF
ARTICLE ONE, SECTION 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH WHEREIN IT IS PROVIDED THAT "PRIVATE
PROPERTY SHALL NOT BE TAKEN OR DAMAGED FOB.
PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION."

In light of the amendment to the answer of the
defendant city to the effect that it assisted in raising
the road in question to protect itself and others ( R. 140),
we assume that no reliance is had on the allegation of
its answer before the amendment was allowed and made,
that in the original allegation to the effect that the city
did not participate in the raising of the road (R. 41-44).
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
DEFENDANTS TO AMEND THEIR PLEADING BY STRIKING FROM THE COMPLAINT THE ALLEGATIONS TO THE
EFFECT THAT THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THE
PLAINTIFF WAS ,CAUSED BY A CHANGE IN THE
COURSE OF THE RIVER AND SUBSTITUTING THEREFOR
THE ALLEGATION THAT THE DEFENDANT CITY HAD
A RIGHT TO DO WHAT WAS DONE BECAUSE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF AN EMERGENCY TO PROTECT ITS PROPERTY FROM A COMMON ENEMY (Tr. 140).

We are mindful that a trial court has a discretion
to allow amendment of pleadings, and that under Rule
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ment may be made at any time, even after judg1nent,
to c:ause the pleadings to conform to the evidence. However, in this case the defendant city in its answer (R. 43)
alleged that by reason of changing the course of the
river and lowering the same "10 or 12 feet this made
a heavy draw and washed out the plaintiff's land
and other lands above the highway 91; had this not
been lowered, the plaintiff would not have suffered
very much damage and said river would have drained
off slowly and the cutting of the banks and the land
would not have occurred."
Even in those states such as California where the
doctrine of the right of a property owner to take measures to protect his property against flood waters, such
right must be exercised reasonably and without negligence. House vs. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 153 Pac. (2d) 950. In this case, the sudden lowering of the channel of the river some ten or hvelye feet
below plaintiff's land resulting in the dmnage, complained of, might well have constituted negligence.
While the evidence does not show just what part, if .any.
the officers or employees of the City took in the work
of lowering the channel of the river, the eYidence does
show that the City entered into an arrange1nent with
Utah County and the State Road Con1mission to take
over the control of the flood water. See testilnony of
Mr. Ehner, Tr. 9. By granting the nwtion of defendant
City to strike snell allegations, especian~~ after plaintiff
rested, deprived her of a right to rely upon such allegations as an ad1nission of the defendant City that 1night
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well have constituted negligence. The mere fact that
the City may not have directly participated in the sudden lowering of the channel of the river, to plaintiff's
damage, does not relieve it from liability. 52 Am. Jur.
-15-1 and 455, Sections 114, 115 and 116, and cases cited
in footnotes.

POINT TWO
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW THAT THE PLAINTIFF RELEASED THE DEFENDANT CITY FROM LIABILITY ON ACCOUNT OF THE DAMAGE COMPLAINED OF.

Defendant City claims that it was released fron1
the damages complained of by reason of the language
contained in Exhibit D. 40 which reads thus: "That
we . . . hereby release . . . the City of Spanish Fork
from all liability for damage to any real or personal
property owned by the signers hereto in the .above described sections along Spanish Fork River or along its
canals and tributaries, by reason of work done by or
at the instance of the above described bodies politic in
dredging, cleaning, sandbagging, doing revertment work
and bank protection, removing debris, removing other
obstructions, or in doing any other work to .alleviate
flood conditions or prevent flooding from Spanish Fork
River, or any of its canals or tributaries, or drainage
system fed by the Spanish Fork River."
The plaintiff is not here complaining because of the
doing of any of the acts specified in the above mentioned
document. The only language that even remotely may
be said to release the City from the acts complained of
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are the general provisions contained in the latter portion
of the language above quoted. The well recognized rule
of "ejusden generis" prevents the defendants from
making any such a claim. W. S. Hatch Co. vs. Public
Service Commission, :3 Utah (2d) 7; 277 2nd Pac. 809.
That rule is especially applicable here. It is obvious that
Mr. McKell signed the instrument so that his property
might be protected from the high waters of the river and
was never intended as a permission to destroy his farm,
the improvements thereon and farming equipment. The
language used is clear as to the purpose sought by the
permission granted. Moreover, if it should be claimed
that the language is uncertain, the testimony heretofor~
referred to of ~l r. McKell at the time he signed the
instrument shows what was intended.
POINT THREE
UNDER THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE, THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS IS NOT INVOLVED.

During the early stages of this .action the defendant
seemed to rely upon two propositions, namely, that
even if the officers of the City were liable, the City could
not be held to respond in dmnages because under the
facts alleged, the acts complained of were done in the
performance of a governmental function and in any event
the acts were done outside of the corporate lilnits of
the city.
Cit~T

There are two reasons why the acts co1nplained of
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covery from a City for acts performed in furtherance
of a governmental function. They are: When a City
takes or damages property for a public purpose, it is
no defense to s.ay that the same was done in furtherance
of a governmental function. The provisions of Section
:22 of Article one of the State Constitution makes no such
distinction. The maintenance and protection of property
which is leased for a stock sale is not the performance
of a governmental function. McQuillin on ~f unicipal
Corporations, 2nd Ed. Vol. 6, Sec. 2793, where it is said
that: ''A distinction must be dr.awn, however, between
injuries to property rights and other injuries, since if
the officers of a municipality in the discharge of its
governmental functions and police power invade property rights, the doctrine of respondeat superior applies
and the corporation is liable for their acts." Numerous
cases are cited in a footnote to the text .above quoted
which support the doctrine therein announced.

vVe have

found no case holding that if property is taken or
damaged for a public purpose, no recovery Inay be had
if such taking or damaging is for a governmental purpose. We doubt that any such case can be found where
there is a constitutional provision such as Article One,
Section 22 of our State Constitution. The fact that the
acts complained of were performed outside of the City
would seem to be immaterial. The City may take such
measures as are necessary to protect its property outside of the City as well as that which is within the City.

It is so provided in U.C.A. 1953-10-8-2.
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POINT FOUR
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT, AS A
MATTER OF LAW OR AT ALL, JUSTIFY THE VACATING
OF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE GRANTING OF
A JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT CITY NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT BY REASON OF AN
EMERGENCY.

An emergency as that word is generally understood
and as defined by the adjudicated cases is a sudden unexpected occurrence which calls for immediate action
to avoid an innninent peril. 29 C.J.S. 760-762 and cases
there cited. The evidence in this case falls far short of
measuring up to the elements necessary to constitute an
emergency. It was generally known in 1farch, 1952 at
least six weeks before the high water came down Spanish
Fork River that high water would occur. See testin1ony
of Francis Lundell (Tr. 121-122). The testimony of
Mayor Nielson is to the san1e effect ( Tr. 29-!). ~Ioreover
on April 2, 1952, "\Villimn R. J ex and Parley X eeley very
thoroughly explained the flood problem (Tr. 92). Xothing was done, hm,·e-..:er, towards protecting the :\ld(ell
property, but on the contrar:· when action was taken, it
was calculated to and did cause ,·ery substantial dmnage
to plaintiff's property. ~Ioreover. if the testi1non~r given
h~r Mayor Nielson is to be believed, no substantial dmnage
would have been done if the water had been pern1itted to
take its natural course. ~Iayor Nielson testified:
"If there hadn't been any work done on the
road at all, it would have changed the flood situation by very little. Some water, maybe, would
have gone over the road, but not enough to have
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hurt anybody else. There was a woven wire fence
on the south side of the road that the county
raised and debris of all sorts piled up against that
and, of course, coursed the water back towards
the river" ( Tr. 299).
The evidence shows that Mr. Wm. R. Jex was the
principal person who was concerned .about raising thA
road because he was afraid of some construction work
he was doing would be flooded. He was fearful that his
property might be flooded as early as March 1, 1952.
:Mr. Neeley was also apparently interested bec.ause h8
owned property near that of Mr. J ex which was in the
southwest corner of Spanish Fork City (Tr. 258-259).
We do not contend that some water would not have found
its way into portions of Spanish Fork City and across
the land owned by Spanish Fork City which it leases for
the purpose of conducting stock sales thereon, but we
do contend th.at the plaintiff may not be required to bear
the whole burden, without being compensated therefor,
of the damage done to her property in order to save
from damage the property of others that might have
bee:g damaged if the water had been allowed to take its
natural course.
POINT FIVE
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT, AS A
MATTER OF LAW OR AT ALL, JUSTIFY THE VACATING
OF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE GRANTING
OF A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
UNDER THE DOCTRINE THAT FLOOD WATER IS A COMMON ENEMY AGAINST WHICH A LAND OWNER MAY DO
WHAT WAS HERE DONE TO PROTECT ITS PROPERTY.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
There is well established conflict in the adjudicated
cases dealing with what may and what may not be done
by a land owner to protect his property from flood
waters. Indeed the authorities are not in accord as to
when waters escaping from a natural channel cease to
be regarded .as flood waters. The question as to what may
and what may not be done to control waters escaping
from a natural channel has been before the courts on
numerous occasions, both in the United States and in
England. California seems to have more than its share
of such cases. It is apparently the well settled law in
the State of California that the flow of surface water
may not be interferred with. That is to say, the owner
of the higher lands has an easement over the lower land
to have the water from the upper land flow over the
lower lands without interference that will injure the
upper lands, and so also, the upper land owner may not
change the manner in which the water is wont to flow
off his land to the injury of the lower land owner. It
also seems to be the settled law in California that one
whose lands abut a river may protect himself against
flood waters notwithstanding barriers erected 1nay cause
flood waters to rise higher or flow with greater force
on a neighbor's land. Among the cases fron1 California
so holding are LeBrun vs. Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291
Pac. 825, 72 A.L.R. 336; Archer vs. City of Los Angeles,
119 Pac. ( 2d) 1, in which numerous California cases are
reviewed and in which there is a long dissenting opinion
of two of the justices of the Supreme Court of California. The case of O'Hara vs. Los Angeles County Flood
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

Control District is to the same effect. 119 Pac. (2d) 23, in
which the justices divide as they did in the Archer
case.
It will be seen from those cases and other cases cited
therein that surface waters are those resulting frorn
r.ain and snow falling upon the land, while flood waters
are those which overflow the banks of a river or lake.
It will also be noted that in California one Inay not
lawfully impead the flow of a natural stream if to do
so results in an injury to other land owners.

The law as .announced by the California courts and
some others is in direct conflict with the law in other
jurisdictions. Thus, while in California, one may not
interfer with the natural flow of surface water, in \Vashington surface waters are held to be a common enemy
from which a land owner may do what is reasonably
necessary to protect his property against the same.
It is also held in some jurisdiction that waters which
escape from a river at time of a flood are surface
waters and not waters of a stream, and a property owner
may defend himself against the same, although to do
so may cause injury to others who have done nothing
to protect themselves. Harvey vs. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,
116 Pac. 464. In the case of K eck et al v. Venghause, et al,
127 Iowa 529; 103 N.W. 773, it is held that a riparian
owner may not embank against the natural overflow
from an inland stream where the effect is to cause an
increased volume of water on the lands of another. To
the s.ame effect are M ouvaisterre Drainage and Levee
Dist. vs. Wabash Ry. Co., 299 Ill. 298, 132 N.E. 559;
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O'Connell 'VS. East Tennessee G. R. Co., 87 Ga. 246;
13 N.E. 489. In the case of Sullivan vs. DooZy, 31 Tex.
Civ. App. 589; 73 S.W. 82, it is held that no distinction
may be made between surface and flood waters and that
the rights of the parties is to be determined by the contour of the territory, and that no change may be made
to the damage of another. That under the common law
one must so used his own property as not to damage the
property of another.
In the case of Fordhmn vs. Northern P. R. Co., 50
Mont. 729; 76 Pac. 1040, it is held that water which overflows the banks of a river is still .a part of the stream and
may not be interfered with. Cases dealing with the question here presented will be found collected in 16 A.L.R.
629; 22 A.L.R. 944 and 81 A.L.R. 262. See also 40 A.L.R.
848.

vVe have not attempted to review the numerous eases
dealing with the questions here presented. To do that
would extend this brief far beyond the length that this
court has indicated should be the limit of a brief. So
also the court will doubtless discover from a re.ading
of the cases cited that the smne are in hopeless conflict
as between different jurisdictions and at times in the
same jurisdietion. Moreover, the facts in this case arc
sueh that it becomes unnecessary to follow any of the
various eonflieting doctrines announced by the adjudic.ated cases. Thus, it is the established law in states
which adhere to the doctrine that flood waters are a
eommon enem)~ and as sueh a property owner 1nay take
such reaf\onahle measures as are necessary to protect
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his property against such waters that he becomes liable
if he is negligent in performing such work. House vs.
Los Angeles Cmtnty Flood Control District, 153 Pac.
(2d) 950.
While in this case there may well be an absence of
negligence in the manner in which the road running e.ast
from the northeast corner of plaintiff's land was raised,
there could not well be any question about the defendants
being negligent in failing, for a period of six weeks after
they knew the danger of flood waters, to do anything
to prevent darnage from the flood. The defendants
sought .and was granted a license to go upon the river
and do the necessary work to prevent damage to itself
and the owners of the land abuting on the river about
three weeks before the situation became serious. Aside
from that the defendants wilfully raised the road to
intercept the water escaping from the river and cast
it onto the ).[eKell property .at the northeast corner
thereof.
Some of the witnesses, particularly Mayor Nielson of
defendant city who testified that he knew that the road
was being raised to divert the water across :\JcKell's
land back into the river. I don't think it was to divert it
across ~lcKell's land (Tr. 282). To the same effect is the
testimony of Mr. Lewis (Tr. 314), of Ed M. Beck (Tr.
317) Bert D. Is.aac (Tr. 320). He stated that at the
council meeting it was discussed that they should be careful not to trespass on private property ( Tr. 320) and
of ~rr. Anderson (Tr. 316). The minutes of the city
council of the defendant city show that the city undertook
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to aid in raising the road (Tr. 92-93), and finally after
plaintiff's evidence was all in, the defendants asked for
and were granted leave to amend their pleadings and
allege that the city did aid in doing the work of raising
the road (Tr. 202-204). It is thus apparent that the
defendant city was a party to the infliction of the damage
complained of. There was some controversy as to
whether or not the plaintiff authorized the dynamiting
on plaintiff's land. In light of the fact that it is made
to appear that the dynamiting was made necessary to
minimize the dmnage to the ~1:cKell property, it would
seem that it is not material as to whether :McKell did
or did not authorize something to be done to reduce the
amount of damage.
Returning to the law applicable to a state of facts
such as are here presented, we direct the attention of the
court to the case of Roosevelt Irr. Dist. v. Beardsley Land
and Investment Co., et al., 282 Pac. 937, 36 Ariz. 65, and
cases there cited. In that case an irrigation canal had been
constructed .and in order to protect the same against
water that can1e from the higher ground adjacent
thereto, an embankment \vas constructed parallel to the
canal to intercept water that n1ight flow against and
destroy the c.anal. The water so intercepted was carried
some distance by the embankn1ent and cast upon the
lands at or near the end of the embanklnent. \Yhile
Arizona adheres to the smue doctrine as California as
to flood waters, the Supreme Court of Arizona in disposing of the c.ase said that there is a manifest distinction between c.asting waters upon anothers land and preventing the flow of water upon your own land. The
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evidence in this case conclusively shows that the raising
of the road was intended to and of necessity did cast the
water onto the McKell land. There was no where else
that it could go. The defendant city may not be heard to
say that it did not intend the results that were brought
about by the raising of the road.
The defendants seem to place some importance as
to the matter of whether or not they actually entered
upon plaintiff's premises. If an actual entry had been
made on the McKell premises and a canal excavated tn
the river, doubtless less damage would have been done
than was done by turning the large quantjty of water
thereon and then let the water cut its way to the river
and wash away much more land that it would have
done if a channel had been excavated. Needless to say
to thus turn water onto the land of another constitutes
a trespass. 87 C .•J.S. 966 and cases there cited.
Before leaving this phase of the case, we again
direct the attention of the court to the evidence which
shows that the land was higher along the east boundary
of plaintiff's land than was the land farther east. That
there was a canal extending along the east boundary of
plaintiff's land so that the road had to be raised about
four feet to force the water across plaintiff's land. If
the doctrine of the right to ward off flood waters is
applicable to the facts in this case, it follows that Mci\:ell
had such right, as well as the city. We wonder what
would have happened if McKell had not been confined to
his home because ill and had gone out with trucks to
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compete with the city to see which could build the higher embankment.
POINT SIX
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE AMOUNT
AWARDED TO HER BY THE JURY BY REASON OF
ARTICLE ONE, SECTION 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH WHEREIN IT IS PROVIDED THAT "PRIVATE
PROPERTY SHALL NOT BE TAKEN OR DAMAGED FOR
PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION."

Since the amendment of the City; pleading was
made to the effect that the road was raised to protect
the property of the defendant from the flood watert' of
Spanish Fork River and the evidence shows such to be
the fact, it would seem that this case resolves itself into
two issues, namely the question of law: Do the facts bring
this case within the protection of Article One, Section
22 of the Utah Constitution, or does it as a matter of
law fall within the Police Power of the defendants, and
the question of fact as to the dmnage sustained by the
plaintiff~

We have heretofore in this brief directed the attention of the Court to the evidence of the dmnage sustained
by the plaintiff. The amount of dmnages awarded to
the plaintiff is much less than the evidence would sustain,
but the plaintiff does not raise any question of its being
inadequate. It is plaintiff's position that the facts
in this case falls far short of bringing it within the doctrine of the police power.
If we accept the testilnony of :Mayor Nielson Yiewec1
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in the light of what would have happened if the road
had not been r,aised, it would lead one to the conclusion
that the raising of the road was not even necessary (Tr.
299). To the same effect is the testimony of the members
of the City Council (Tr. 314, 316, 317 and 320). It would
be stretching the police power far beyond the breaking
point to say because some water would flood over part
of Spanish Fork City, that a c,alamity or catastrophe
would flow therefrom. Had it not been that the water
which was forced over the McKell property was concentrated in a large stream with a preciptable slope toward
the river, it is doubtful if any substantial damage would
have been done to the McKell property. Nor does the
evidence support the claim that there was an emergency
when viewed in the light of the fact that it was known
for at least six weeks before high water came that it
would come. If an emergency existed at the time the
flood c,ame, it was in part at least the product of the
defendant City in that it failed to take steps to prepare
for the flood until long after the same became apparent,
and even then without any reason being rnade apparent,
they devoted their time and energy in building up the
ro,ad instead of doing what was necessary and what they
were authorized to do by making the channel of the river
able to carry the additional water.
It is of course the law that the primary function of
the exercise of the police power is to regulate the use of
property not to damage or confiscate the same except in
case of dire necessity. Lewis, on Eminent Dom,ain, 3 Ed.,
Y ol. 1, Sec. 6, pages 13. See also discussion in the case
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of Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 119 Pac. (2d) 20 and
the case of O'Hara v. Los Angeles County, 119 Pac. (2d),
23.
In this case it would appear that the duly constituted
County Commissioners of Utah County and the State
Legislature of Utah thought that this was a case where
the McKells were entitled to be paid for the damage sustained. Otherwise they would not have paid them what
they thought was their just proportion of such damages.
It was Spanish Fork City, through its officers, that
originally urged that action be taken which resulted in
the damages to plaintiff's property. There is every
reason why the defendant City should not be permitted
to escape paying its just share of the dan1ages. That
the defendant City may be required to respond in damages by .an action against it under the Doctrine of Eminent Domain, even if it does not forn1ally bring an action
in condemnation, seems to be well and universally settled.
O'Hara vs. Los Angeles City, supra.
It is submitted that the judgment vacating the verdict of the jury and rendering judgment in f.avor of the
defendant City should be reversed and the Court then
should be directed to reinstate the verdict of the jury
and to render judgment in confonnity therewith and
that appellant should be awarded her costs herein expended. Appellant prays that this court so direct.
Respectfully sub1nitted,
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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